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The most famous statement
of relativism in general is by the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras
(480-411 BCE.): "A human being is the measure of all things - of things
that are, that they are, and of things that are not that they are
not." This reflects the view of many of the sophists that social convention
has a status above nature. Although Protagoras's claim applies to
any proposed standard of knowledge, moral values are at least part
of his position. Most philosophers have assumed that there is some
standpoint--for example, that of God--in relation to which our judgments
are definitively true or false. Relativism is sometimes identified
(usually by its critics) as the thesis that all points of view are
equally valid. In ethics, this amounts to saying that all moralities
are equally good; in epistemology it implies that all beliefs, or
belief systems, are equally true.
Relativistic ethical theories overlap the virtue, deontological, and
teleological categories of ethical theories. They reject any ethical
rule as universal or absolute, assert that ethical standards are grounded
only in social custom, and that there is no objective way to assess
the validity of ethical principles. In particular,
- Ethical values are relative to some particular framework or
standpoint (e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an era, a
language, or a conceptual scheme), and
- No standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others.
Anthony Aaby, Walla Walla College
aabyan@wwc.edu
If you would like a topic discussed or have information you would like to
provide, please email Rod Erakovich
or Vicki Edwards. We look forward
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Two Views of Virtue: Absolute Relativism and Relative Absolutism
Author: F.
F. Centore
Examines the weaknesses and strengths of the two basic positions in ethics: the man-centered model and the God-centered model for deciding between right and wrong behavior. (Greenwood Press, 5/30/2000) ISBN: 0-313-31412-8. 216 pages.
http://www.praeger.com/books/BookDetail.asp?dept_id=1&sku=GM1412 |
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Notes on Moral Relativism
Defining the issue - The main question:
Are there any objective moral standards? Are there any standards that apply to everyone whether they know it or not? The moral relativist says no.
http://stripe.colorado.edu/~morristo/rel_new.html |
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Reason, Revolution, Relativism, and Reactionaries
Dr. Charles Ess - Philosophy and Religion Department - Drury University
"From Dichotomies to Trichotomies" We begin by examining the limits of a dualist logic - especially as this dualism leads us to several common assumptions, i.e., that we are forced to choose between a claim being entirely true or false, and (correlatively), that our claims are either entirely objective or subjective, that our claims are either absolutely/dogmatically/universally true or entirely relative to the individual and/or his/her culture. Over against these dilemmas, I try to introduce a third position - one characterized in terms such as "constructivist"/intersubjectivity and rational (or critical) pluralism. Rational pluralism presumes that the careful use of reason will avoid both dogmatism and (ethical) relativism, by discovering/developing "quasi-universal" or "relatively absolute" values and claims which may be applied/interpreted/understood in a variety of ways in relation to a variety of individual and cultural contexts. Examples of a pluralist rationality? I provide some examples of such claims from the history of Western philosophy - specifically, from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant. For a contemporary example of rational pluralism, I describe Habermas's theory of communicative reason, the rules of discourse, and the ideal speech situation, as necessary conditions for democratic dialogues and governance. Finally, I ask the skeptical question: does Habermas's theory work in praxis - and describe the results of a recent debate in which, as Catholic and Protestant participants discussed abortion issues following Habermas's discourse ethics, they arrived in fact at a consensus which included both significant points of agreement while preserving intractable religious differences in a pluralism.
http://www.drury.edu/ess/reason/reason1.html |
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Contextual Analysis in Ethics
Peter Unger, New York University
When assessed by an appropriate ethical standard, most of us usually behave quite acceptably. Or, so we generally judge. And, when assessed by an appropriate epistemological standard, most of us usually do quite well, too: First, we know many things about the world and, second, we're usually justified in holding those of our confident beliefs that aren't quite instances of knowledge. Or, again, so we generally judge. As we generally judge, then, both in our behaving and in our believing, things are usually quite acceptable.
Contextual Analysis in Ethics |
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 Moral Relativism
from NPR's Morning Edition, Wednesday, January 27, 1999
Commentator Kevin Phillips talks about the notion of `moral relativism' by which the president has been held to a relatively low standard of morality because the economy is good. (3:33)
http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/segment_display.cfm?segID=22629 |
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Towards a Dialectical Ethics beyond Objectivism and Relativism
Daniel Vokey, Ontario Institute of Studies in Education of the
University of Toronto
THE ETHICS OF INTEGRITY. Mason's response to the problems attendant
upon relativism is to posit the ethics of integrity, "constituted
by respect for the dignity of our and each other's being, and by taking
responsibility for the consequences of moral choices." Mason's main
objection to relativism is that it leads to social, interpersonal,
and personal consequences that are morally unacceptable. He cites
an impressive list of theorists who are also unwilling to accept the
human costs of relativism and who also reassert norms of truth and
justice. Of course, this reluctance to accept its implications does
not justify the conclusion that relativism is false, but it does warrant
a second look at its arguments. Concerning those arguments, Mason's
other objection to relativism is that it does not follow simply from
the fact of persistent disagreement. He argues that truth cannot be
reduced to warranted assertability: "the ontological cannot be reduced
to the epistemological."
http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/97_docs/vokey.html |
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The Truth in Ethical Relativism
by Hugh LaFollette, Journal of Social Philosophy, 1991, 146-54. [pdf
version]
Ethical relativism is the thesis that ethical principles or judgments are relative to the individual or culture. When stated so vaguely relativism is embraced by numerous lay persons and a sizeable contingent of philosophers. Other philosophers, however, find the thesis patently false, even wonder how anyone could seriously entertain it. Both factions are on to something, yet both miss something significant as well. Those who whole-heartedly embrace relativism note salient respects in which ethics is relative, yet erroneously infer that ethical values are noxiously subjective. Those who reject relativism do so because they think ethics is subject to rational scrutiny, that moral views can be correct or incorrect. But in rejecting objectionable features of relativism they overlook significant yet non-pernicious ways in which ethics is relative.
http://www.etsu.edu/philos/faculty/hugh/relative.htm |
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Relativism Power Point
Relativism Power Point |
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Following are recommended by Dr. Lawrence Hinman of San Diego State...
Ruth Benedict's "A Defense of Moral Relativism,"
The Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 10 (1934), pp. 59-82
is one of the most influential and often-reprinted contemporary defenses
of ethical relativism by a leading figure in twentieth century anthropology.
It is reprinted in numerous anthologies, including Everyday Life,
edited by Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers, 3rd edition (San Diego:
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1992).
Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, edited by Michael
Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1982), which contains essays by Philippa Foot, Bernard Williams, Gilbert
Harman, David Lyons, and Geoffrey Harrison
Relativism: Interpretation and Conflict, edited with
an Introduction by Michael Krausz (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1989) contains an excellent selection of articles primarily
by philosophers but also contains articles by two eminent anthropologists,
Clifford Geertz and Richard Shweder.
For an excellent survey of recent work on moral relativism, see Robert
M. Stewart and Lynn L. Thomas, "Recent Work on Ethical Relativism.,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28 (April, 1991),
pp. 85-100; also see the extensive bibliography on relativism in Harvey
Siegel, Relativism Refuted (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987).
One of the more persuasive arguments in favor of relativism from the
fact of moral disagreement is to be found in J. L. Mackie's Ethics:
Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1976).
Judith Wagner DeCew, "Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism,"
Ethics, Vol. 101 (October, 1990), pp. 27-41
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, "Moral Conflict and Political
Consensus," Ethics, Vol. 101 (October, 1990), pp.
64-88
William Tolhurst, "The Argument from Moral Disagreement,"
Ethics, Vol. 87 (April, 1987), pp. 610-21.
Gilbert Harman has offered a vigorous defense of ethical relativism
in Gilbert Harman's "Moral Relativism Defended,"
Philosophical Review, Vol. 84 (1975), pp. 3-22; his "Relativistic
Ethics: Morality as Politics," Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
Vol. 3 (1978), pp. 109-21; and his "What Is Moral Relativism?"
in Values and Morals, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon
Kim (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978).
http://ethics.acusd.edu/theories/Relativism/index.html |
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